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The literature on leadership suggests that the performance context of a
succession event and the origin of a newly appointed leader moderate
the relationship between the succession and its consequences for performance in large corporations. We tested that premise with data from
477 large corporations and a measure of excess stock market returns.
The findings show that investors are most favorably predisposed to
successions in which outsiders are appointed to financially healthy
firms.

The scholarly and business worlds alike are giving increasing attention
to executive accountability, partly because pressures from stockholder
groups are mounting on this issue. Researchers, however, remain divided as
to whether appointing a new leader influences the performance of a large
organization. Some have found that leadership doesn't matter: a leader will
not alter performance because organizations-particularly large ones-tend
to run themselves (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972;
Mintzberg, 1979). Thus, the replacement of a leader also will not matter;
succession becomes ritual scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch, 1964). Others
have found that leadership does matter (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981) but that
the disruption that succession causes cancels the positive effect of replacing
an unsuccessful manager (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986). Still other researchers have argued that whether a new leader has a positive, neutral, or negative
influence on performance depends on the match between the leader's characteristics and the job requirements (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick
& Mason, 1984). However, subsequent studies have not uncovered a consistent set of contingent factors that explain when a positive successionperformance relationship will occur in large corporations (Beatty & Zajac,
We are grateful to George Brower, Hugh O'Neill, and several anonymous journal reviewers
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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1987; Friedman & Singh, 1987; Furtado & Rozeff, 1987; Lubatkin, Chung,
Rogers, & Owers, 1986; Reinganum, 1985).
There are at least three reasons, however, to investigate further the possibility that executive succession can influence the financial performance of
large organizations. First, compelling anecdotal evidence from the business
world supports the position that leadership can make a difference in large
organizations. For example, it is difficult to overlook the contributions of
Jack Welch at General Electric, John Opel at IBM, and Lee Iacocca at Chrysler
Corporation. Second, most studies have overlooked the presuccession performance of firms experiencing succession and failed to consider the origin
of a successor in light of that context. Research on corporate turnaround
(Hofer, 1980; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976) and on the causes of executive
succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1985) has, however, recognized the importance
of these two contingent factors, as did Hall (1987), who argued that a leader
is important only in times of organizational crisis, change, and growth.
Third, some of the ambiguity surrounding the succession-performance
issue may originate in the way that financial performance is defined. Succession studies have traditionally defined performance by an accountingbased measure such as return on assets or by a security market-based measure such as abnormal returns. The finance literature, however, has devel-

oped a strong case for using a security market measure called excess returns
(Scholes & Williams, 1977). This measure overcomes the principal criticisms
of the abnormal returns measure and grants researchers the advantages of
using stock market data. Only recently have data files existed that allow
researchers to adopt this measure in large-sample studies.
The present study extended past research efforts by examining two factors that are believed to be important determinants of succession and leadership effects: organizational context, in terms of presuccession performance, and successor's origin as an insider or as an outsider. Using a multiple regression design, we simultaneously considered the independent and
interactive effects of those two contingent factors while controlling for organizational size. We calculated the dependent variable, excess returns, over
various time horizons to distinguish between succession effects and longerterm leadership effects. Finally, a large data set (477 instances of appointments) permitted a rigorous testing of hypotheses relating chief executive
officer (CEO) succession to performance.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Performance Context

Previous research has suggested that the performance of an organizatio
before a leader's replacement is an important contextual factor. For exampl
organizational performance is a major determinant of executive tenure (A

lan & Panian, 1982; James & Soref, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980), an

executive replacement is a common response to poor financial performance
(Brady & Helmich, 1984; Dalton & Kesner, 1985).
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Strategic management and organization theory scholars have also asserted that an organization's performance influences its adaptiveness (Bour-

geois, 1981; Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983; Litschert & Bonham, 1978).

Firms that can generate resources in excess of their needs to pay suppliers,
develop markets, attract employees, fend off competitors' attacks, and otherwise engage in basic business activities have "slack." Slack gives an organization the luxury of making decisions that are based on extensive information searches (Fredrickson, 1985), maintaining stability through intermittently good and bad times (Cyert & March, 1963), and attracting capital at
low cost from the debt and equity markets (Porter, 1985). Slack may also
foster creative behavior (Bourgeois, 1981), a motivated and committed work
force (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984), and a culture that identifies with winning; opposite effects are expected in low-performance settings. In addition,
the leaders of high-performing firms should perceive a wide array of investment options and be granted great discretion in adjusting to environmental
influences (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
It is tempting to conclude that leaders who inherit a high-performance
context have greater opportunity to affect future performance than leaders
who inherit a low-performance context. However, low performance may also
influence the adaptiveness of organizations, although the process is quite
different. Low performance is associated with a sense of urgency and a
departure from some desired status quo. Although managers may lack the
time and resources for extensive information searches during times of low
performance, their decisions may be at least as rational and have as much
impact as those made in a high-performance context. As Cyert and March
(1963) observed, poor performance pressures managers to make precise, discriminating decisions because they have little margin for error. Mintzberg,
Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) noted that during times of high performance
managers tend to direct attention to problems but are more casual with
opportunities, which they assume can be exploited. Hall (1987) viewed both
performance contexts as important.
Two studies have examined the role of presuccession performance in
explaining stock market reactions to succession events. Lubatkin and colleagues (1986) found no relationship, and Friedman and Singh (1986) found
(at the .10 level of significance) that when presuccession performance is
poor, the market's reaction to succession tends to be positive. The two studies share three potential research flaws. Both dichotomized the context variable into high- and low-performance categories rather than letting it remain
continuous and thus lost information that may have borne on their results.
They used as their dependent variable a short-term measure of abnormal
return that may have failed to capture the full stock market reaction to the
succession events. Finally, they failed to adequately account for another
important contextual factor, organizational size.
Given the drawbacks in past studies of the performance-context issue
and the conflicting theories on the subject, we will again test the following
general hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: Holding size constant, the performance of a
firm at the time of a succession event will affect the ability of a newly appointed leader to influence future earnings.
Successor Origin

Previous research has also supported the existence of a linkage between
the origin of a successor and firm performance. For example, during a smallsample field study, Kotter (1982) observed that outsiders who lacked a thorough understanding of the business that they were inheriting generally contributed less to their organizations than did insiders. Further, outsiders have
a greater disruptive influence on an organization (Allen, Panian, & Lotz,
1979), which may in turn produce negative outcomes like a decline in morale and an increase in turnover (Grusky, 1964). Finally, an outside appointment may signal the failure of a firm's human-capital-investment program to
develop depth in its management ranks and therefore raise questions about
the firm's ability to compete in the future (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987).
As with performance context, the linkage between successor origin and
future organizational performance remains conceptually appealing but empirically ambiguous. Lubatkin and colleagues (1986) and Friedman and
Singh (1987) found that outside appointments produced significantly higher
abnormal returns than inside appointments. Furtado and Rozeff (1987)
found the opposite, and Beatty and Zajac (1987) found no distinction between the two types of appointments. Reinganum (1985) found significant,
positive abnormal returns only for outside appointments in small firms in
which the announcement of the appointment coincided with the announcement of the departure of the former officeholder. None of these studies has
explicitly accounted for the size of each firm studied, though all have recognized that size is a potentially important covariate.
In light of the inconsistent findings about successor origin,
Hypothesis 2: Holding size constant, the origin of an appointed successor will affect his or her ability to influence
future earnings.
Interactive Effects

A contingency view of management succession suggests that whether a
new leader has a positive, neutral, or negative influence on performance
depends on how well the characteristics of the leader match the requirements set by the context of a job (Fiedler, 1964; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Consistent with this view, we developed an additional hypothesis that recognizes that the different task demands associated with high- and low-performing firms may require the different leadership influences associated with outside and inside appointments.
A contingent relationship is expected for firms that are performing
poorly at the time of a succession event. Previous research suggests that
outsiders will be more able to turn such firms around than will insiders
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(Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978; Schendel &
Patton, 1976). Because insiders may have a limited perspective (Cyert &
March, 1963), they are less able to deal with changes in an organization's
environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In contrast, outsiders have been
associated with organizational adaptiveness and change since they have less
commitment to an organization's strategies and values (Helmich, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981). As a result, they are more likely to alter its mission, objectives,
and strategy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
The opposite contingent relationship is expected for high-performing
firms. Because insiders are less disruptive to an organization than outsiders
(Brown, 1982; Helmich, 1977), they may be more able than outsiders to
maintain high performance.
Hypothesis 3: The performance of a firm prior to a change
in leadership and the origin of a successor moderate the
relationship between executive succession and subsequent earnings. Specifically,
Hypothesis 3a: Outsiders will have a more positive impact on performance in low-performing firms than insiders will.

Hypothesis 3b: Insiders will have a more positive impact
on performance in high-performing firms than outsiders

will.

Organizational Size: An Extraneous Influence

Many studies of leadership have recognized the importance that the size
of an organization has for the ability of a leader to influence performance.
For example, large organizations are associated with entrenched power
structures that help to insulate top management from external pressures. As
a result, it seems that large organizations are more likely than small ones to
replace top managers from inside (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Furtado & Rozeff,
1987) and more likely to minimize the influence that a new leader may have
on corporate performance (Hall, 1987; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Although
most succession studies have not established explicit controls for size, it
follows that such controls are important. The studies by Furtado and Rozeff
and by Reinganum established categorical controls by arbitrarily splitting
their samples into two size groupings, large and small firms, and then presenting abnormal returns for each. A limitation with categorical controls is
that they lose information that may have a bearing on the results. The present
study controlled for the effects of size by including it as a continuously
scaled independent variable in a multiple regression equation.
METHODS

Sources of Data

An exhaustive list of firms in which a succession had taken place and
the origins of the successors were identified from Forbes's annual June is-

52

Academy of Management Journal

March

sues about executive compensation. Because these issues list the 800 firms
with the highest paid executives, the population is biased toward organizations that believe in the importance of leadership, at least in so far as high
salaries are evidence. Indirect support for this assertion comes from a study
by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), who found compensation (salary plus
bonus) to be significantly related to abnormal stock-price performance. We
identified 1,187 CEO successions during the period 1971-85. We then excluded CEO appointments where we could not clearly identify the first
public announcement in the Wall Street Journal and all appointments in
firms that made confounding announcements of major corporate events such
as mergers, dividend changes, and capital expenditure plans during a twomonth period (50 trading days) before the succession announcement (t - 50,
t - 1). We used that criterion to control for the possibility that announcements of other events might bias findings attributed to an executive appointment. The period over which we measured presuccession performance (described under Independent Variables) was also carefully screened for possible takeover bids, succession events, and other major corporate events that
might conceal the firms' long-term performance trends. Also, the appointments made had to be lasting; we excluded firms that made a second CEO
appointment during the 200 trading days after the succession event we were
studying. In short, the general selection rule followed was to exclude a
succession event if there was reasonable evidence of a potentially confounding event. A total of 573 cases remained. Of those, 505 met an additional
requirement for inclusion which was that the firm be listed on the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Excess Returns Data File for a full
300 trading days (approximately 15 months) before and after the succession
announcement so that we could obtain estimates for the five dependent
variables (see Time Frame) and the performance-context variable. A final
criterion for inclusion had to do with determining the origin of the successor: we excluded 28 cases from further investigation because the successor
did not fall into either origin category (categories are described under Independent Variables). The final group therefore included 477 succession cases
at 357 firms and represented 40 percent of the 1,187 cases identified in
Forbes.1

Dependent Variable: Excess Returns

Given the limitations of accounting-based measures, researchers in
management have given more attention to the use of capital market measures
to evaluate the effect of events like management succession (Lubatkin &
Shrieves, 1986). These measures are ex ante measures in that they reflect
investors' expectations of future performance. As such, capital market measures contrast with traditional accounting-based measures, which are ex
post, reflecting historical performance patterns. Capital market measures
1 Eight percent of the group were delisted from public listings between 14 and 60 months
after the announcement of the CEO changes we studied.
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assess the influence of an event on a firm's security (common stock) by
estimating the normal, or expected, return to the stock in the absence of an
event. The abnormal, or unexpected, return to the stock is the difference
between its observed return and its expected return. Positive abnormal returns suggest that stockholder value is being created.
Theoretically, abnormal returns represent an unbiased estimate of investors' evaluation of the changes in future earnings that they expect because
of some firm-specific event, such as a change in leadership, and not because
of overall market movements. Thus, abnormal returns should be a strong
surrogate for actual economic performance. In practice, however, the market
model's ordinary-least-squares estimates of abnormal returns suffer from a
potentially serious econometric problem. The problem results from nonsynchronous trading of securities: many securities are traded infrequently, and
their prices are therefore only reported at distinct random intervals. This
irregularity makes calculations of returns "for almost all securities biased
and inconsistent" (Scholes & Williams, 1977: 310). To date, researchers have
tolerated this bias because of computational difficulties associated with correcting for it.

In 1983, CRSP made available a daily returns file that corrects for nonsynchronous bias. For this file, called the Daily Excess Returns File, CRSP
computes excess returns, or the unbiased analogues of abnormal returns,
through a three-step procedure originally developed by Scholes and
Williams (1977). First the Scholes-Williams beta, or systematic risk, is com
puted for each security using a three-day moving-average market window.
Beta, or systematic risk, represents the sensitivity of a firm's returns to ov
all stock market trends. The three-day moving average ensures against potential nonsynchronous trading problems (Brown & Warner, 1985). Next, o
the basis of average annual betas, CRSP ranks all securities traded on the
New York and the American Stock Exchanges into ten risk classes; the first
contains securities with betas in the 90th percentile or higher, the second,
securities with betas in the 80th to 89th percentiles, and so on. Finally,
excess returns are computed for each firm for each day by (1) calculating the
firm's one-day common stock return, which is change in price after adjustment for any stock splits or dividends, (2) identifying the risk class that most
closely matches the firm's level of systematic risk, and (3) calculating the
one-day portfolio returns of all firms in that risk class and then subtracting
that return from the firm's stock return. The Appendix details this three-step
procedure.
In addition to correcting for nonsynchronous bias, excess returns use a
superior benchmark, or control, to represent normal or expected returns.
Whereas abnormal returns are calculated for each firm by comparing its
returns to some market-wide adjusted average, excess returns compare a
firm's returns only to the returns of firms in the market that have similar
levels of systematic risk. To the extent that firms that have similar risk
profiles are also similar along various dimensions that determine systematic
risk and stockholder return, such as organizational size (Ben-Zion & Shelit,

54

Academy of Management Journal

March

1975), financial leverage (Hamada, 1972), cyclicality (Fabozzi & Francis,
1979), and market power (Moyer & Chatfield, 1983), excess returns will
better control for influences extraneous to research objectives than will abnormal returns.

All capital market measures, including excess returns, however, suffer
from one shortcoming: they can only estimate the full impact of wholly
unanticipated events. Succession events are not likely to be wholly unanticipated; indeed, we could argue that all leadership changes are partially
anticipated, except, of course, those caused by the untimely death of an
incumbent. This shortcoming, however, need not invalidate the use of market measures for hypothesis testing. First, early anticipation biases the results against finding stock returns that differ in a statistical sense from their
expected level, thus promoting a conservative test (Beatty & Zajac, 1987;
Brown & Warner, 1985). Second cumulating excess returns over various time
horizons surrounding an announcement day allows approximation of the
impact of early investor awareness on stock returns. A later section discusses
the issue of time frame and describes the horizons used in this study.
Independent Variables
The performance context of firms at the time of the succession events
was approximated by cumulating their excess returns over 200 trading days
(approximately 9.5 months), beginning 300 trading days before the first public announcement of an executive change. This period should be adequate to
capture long-term trends in investors' expectations of future earnings and
thus should approximate firm performance in the absence of a change in
leadership. We excluded the 100 trading days immediately preceding the
announcements to minimize the chance that the succession events them-

selves would bias the context measures, which would be the case if investors

anticipated events before their first public announcement. The validity of
the context variable used in this study to represent the financial well-being
of a firm at the time of the succession event can be gauged by observing the
ratio of succession firms we studied with negative context measures -those
performing less well than firms with similar risk-and those with positive
context measures. Inasmuch as executive replacement is a common response
to poor performance, a valid context measure should find most successions
to be in poorly performing firms. Indeed, about 65 percent of the firms used
in this study performed less well than firms with similar risk during the
designated context period. A chi-square statistic significant to the .01 level
suggested that the observed frequency of low-performing firms differed from
what would be expected if below-market performance randomly occurred in
the population.
The origin of the successor CEO was determined in a straightforward
categorical way with one provision: to avoid blurring the distinction between insider and outsider, we designated an insider as a successor who had
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at least five years of tenure with the firm in question and an outsider as a
successor who had not been with the organization for more than one year
before moving to the top. In virtually all cases, outsiders were brought directly into the position of CEO. Thus, the definition used in this study
represents extreme cases of outside appointments and is comparable to Vancil's definition of recent outsider (1987: 262), rather than to his broader
definition of outsider (1987: 56). We excluded cases that did not fall into
either category from further investigation. Computationally, origin is a dichotomous dummy variable defined as 0 if a successor was an insider and as
1 if a successor was an outsider. We examined possible moderating effects of
context and origin by including an interaction variable in the multiple regression model.
A final independent variable, corporate size, was added to the regression equation as a control variable. We measured size as a continuous independent variable, by calculating the logarithm of each firm's stock market
capitalization (price per share times number of shares outstanding) on the
last trading day of the year immediately preceding the year of a CEO appointment. We also controlled size by limiting the population of succession
cases to large organizations. Finally, we checked correlation of size with the
other independent variables to determine if size was an important covariate.
Time Frame: Selecting the Relevant Horizon Length

If a change in CEO is viewed as a favorable indicator for future earnings,
the market price of a firm's stock will increase as investors learn of a leadership change. The problem facing researchers is determining exactly when
investors know all succession-related information (Malatesta & Thompson,
1985). Studies in finance journals have tended to define the relevant succession time frame as the announcement day plus the trading day preceding
it (Furtado & Rozeff, 1987).
Studies in management journals, however, have argued that the two-day
announcement effect may not capture the full market evaluation of a succession event (Beatty & Zajac, 1987; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986; Reinganum,
1985). For example, Reinganum discussed the possibility of information
leaking to the marketplace before a change in leadership is officially made
public. He also recognized the possibility of noninstantaneous investor reactions occurring during the period after an announcement. For the current
study, therefore, we cumulated excess daily returns over five different horizons and then performed multiple regression analyses on each. Figure 1
illustrates the five horizons.

One horizon is the commonly used 2-day announcement period (t - 1,
t = 0), in which t = 0 is the day of the first public announcement of a
succession and t - 1 is the trading day immediately preceding the announcement day. The results of such short-term analysis should capture
investors' perceptions about the effects on a firm's future earnings of a suc-
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FIGURE 1

Various Time Horizons Surrounding Succession Announcements
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The second horizon (t - 50, t = 0) is a period of about two and a half
months (51 trading days) preceding and including an announcement day; it
is designed to capture early market awareness of a leadership change. Although it was not possible to identify the precise date of market awareness
for each firm, the time period examined here should be long enough to
capture most succession-related information and short enough to avoid any
serious bias from unrelated, firm-specific events.
The third horizon (t + 1, t + 50) allowed us to examine excess returns
during the two-and-a-half-month period immediately following an announcement day. With the uncertainty resolved concerning if and when a
leadership change will occur and who will be appointed, investors can reevaluate their initial expectations about future earnings. Further, investors
are likely to form their revised perceptions on the basis of a different set of
factors, those that can only be known with certainty after the appointment of
a new leader. This situation pertains particularly if investors did not anticipate who the new leader would be.
The fourth horizon (t - 50, t + 50) covers the full 101 trading days
surrounding and including an announcement day and allows cumulation of
the returns for the second and third horizons.

The final horizon (t + 100, t + 300) captures the performance of firms
over a nine-and-a-half-month period beginning 100 trading days after a succession announcement. This period should be adequate to capture long-term
trends in investor expectations but be free of any residual succession effects.
Further, the results for this horizon may best capture leadership effects be-
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cause it approximates a period when a new leader is likely to make substantive changes in strategic and operational domains.
Methods of Analysis

A multiple regression equation for both the independent and interactive
effects of the two contingent factors and the independent effects of corporate
size on stockholder returns, the dependent variable, was developed in the
following form: excess returns - f (context, origin, context x origin, size).
Although the signs and magnitude of the regression coefficients are
sufficient for testing the significance of the interaction between context and
origin, they do not say much about the form of the contingency relationship.
Specifically, the coefficients alone may not allow for clear inferences about
when it is best to hire an insider and when an outsider. By segregating the
firms by origin and by performance context, we pushed the analysis of the
third hypothesis to a second stage. In order to dichotomize the context variable, we first ranked firms according to their context measure and then
partitioned the ranking into approximate thirds. The high-performing third
consisted of firms with positive context measures, or firms that demonstrated the ability to yield returns better than the security benchmark returns
during the designated context period. The low-performing third consisted of
firms with strongly negative context measures. In order to maximize contrast, we excluded the middle third from this investigation but included it in
the regression analysis. We then calculated a mean measure of excess returns
for each of the four possible contingencies that come from the intersection of
the two origin and context classifications. Finally, separate two-tailed t-tests
of mean differences were used to statistically compare investors' reactions to
insider and outsider appointments to each of the two presuccession contexts.

RESULTS

Of the 477 succession cases analyzed, 305 firms (65 percent) per
less well than firms with similar risk during the designated contex
Inside appointments were involved in 423 firms. The low percentage of
outside appointments (11.3%) is consistent with the findings of other succession studies in large corporations. For example, Beatty and Zajac (1987)
found the incidence of outsiders to be 12 percent and Friedman and Singh
(1987) found it to be 15 percent. Also, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) found that
as firm size increased, the incidence of outsiders decreased.

Finally, the current data are heavily biased toward largeness. The mean
equity market capitalization is $1,825 million, with a minimum of $17 million (Allied Supermarket in 1975) and a maximum of $46,792 million (IBM
in 1982). The firms are therefore considerably larger than the typical large
firm in Reinganum's (1985) sample, which had a median market value of
$280 million. Finally, only 21 firms (4.4%) in the current sample had market
values below $65.5 million, the size used by Reinganum to separate large
firms from small ones.
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In sum, the high incidence of poor performance before changing CEO,
the low incidence of outside appointments, and the overall largeness suggests that the set of firms collected in the present study adequately represents the population of large industrial organizations at a time when they
change their CEOs.
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
of all variables. Table 2 summarizes the results for the 51-day preannouncement period (t - 50, t = 0), the 50-day post-announcement period (t + 1,
t + 50), and the 101-day cumulative succession period (t - 50, t + 50).
Similarly, Table 3 summarizes the results of the multiple regression equation performed on excess returns during the 2-day announcement period
(t - 1, t + 0) and the 200-day long-term leadership period (t + 100, t + 50).
Overall, investors are not indifferent about changes in leadership.
Rather, the means in Table 1 shows that investors, on the average, revise
downward their earnings expectations, driving down a firm's stock price an
average 1 percent during the preannouncement period (p < .01) and an
additional 3.5 percent during the 50-day post-announcement period (p <
.01). These findings suggest that investors do not view CEO succession as
unimportant or as an exercise in ritual scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch,
1964). Further, they suggest that investors do not generally hold an overly
"romanticized view of leadership" (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). To
the contrary, investors appear skeptical about the alleged positive intentions
that motivate succession decisions. However, as predicted, the consequences of succession for performance depend on the conditions surrounding the event.
The hypothesis about context (Hypothesis 1) received partial support.
As expected, the performance of a firm during the time preceding a succession event influences investors' assessment of executive changes, at least
during the 51-day presuccession horizon, as reported in Table 2. During this
presuccession period, the influence of context on excess returns is positive
and significant (p < .05), indicating that the better firms perform before
changing CEOs, the more favorably predisposed investors are to a change.
However, context as an independent factor does not appear to have an important bearing on investors' expectations during the 50-day post-succession
period (Table 2) and the 2-day announcement period (Table 3), suggesting
that the information value of context as it relates to a succession event is

fully discounted by the time an event occurs. Finally, context again appea
to influence investors' expectations during the 200-day post-succession period, although the causation is weak (p < .10) and inverse (Table 3). We
posited that during this stewardship period, investors base their expectations on their assessment of a leader's initial strategic and operational decisions rather than on the effects of succession per se.
The results also indicate partial support for the hypothesis about origin
(Hypothesis 2). In the case of outside appointments, origin appears to have
positive and significant effects on investors' expectations for all time frames

TABLE 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelation
Variables'
1.

Context

-

0.07**

Means

s.d.

1

2

0.25

2. Origin 0.11** 0.31 -.06

3. Interaction term -0.01** 0.11 .42** .15**

4. Logarithm of size 6.13** 3.43 -.05 -.13** .07
5. Daily excess returns (-1, 0) 0.00 0.04 -.00 .08* .04 -.03
6. Daily excess returns (-50, 0) -0.01** 0.12 .12** .04 .07 .03
7. Daily excess returns (1, 50) -0.03** 0.13 .07 .09* .09* .02
8. Daily excess returns (-50, +50) -0.04** 0.17 .14** .09* .12** .04
9. Daily excess returns (100, 300) -0.05** 0.24 -.09* .10*'* -.08* .02
aN = 477

b Daily excess returns are cumulated over the time frame indicated within
tp < .10

* p < .05
** p < .01

3

March

Academy of Management Journal

60

TABLE 2

Results of Multiple Regression of Succession for Three Time Horizons
51-day

50-day

101-day

Presuccession Post-succession Cumulative
Perioda

Periodb

Standard

Intervalc

Standard

Standard

Variables Betas Errors Betas Errors Betas Errors

Intercept -.004 .015 - .022 .015 - .027 .020
Context

.057*

.025

-

.005

.024

.052

.033

Origind .029 .019 .055** .019 .084** .025
Interaction of
context and

origin
Size

.025

.000

F4,472
R2

.060

.002

-

.156**
.002

2.31*
.02

.058

.002

3.76**
.03

.181*

-

.002

.078
.003

5.42**
.04

a Period defined as t - 50, t = 0

b Period defined as t + 1, t + 50
c Period defined as t - 50, t + 50

d Origin is a dichotomous dummy variable with 0 = inside successor, 1 = outside suc
cessor.

tp < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

except the 51-day presuccession period. The findings, therefore, clearly suggest that investors view an outside appointment as having a more favorable
impact on earnings than an inside appointment. Further, the origin findings
are noticeably different from the context findings regarding when each influences investors' expectations: investors appear to be more concerned with
the context of succession events before CEO changes and more concerned
with the origin of new leaders after the changes. Apparently, investors have
no accurate knowledge of information embedded in the broad origin measure on the likelihood of strategy, policy, and administration changes until
after a successor is announced.

Perhaps the most interesting results come from testing Hypothesis 3.
During the 50-day post-succession period, the time after investors have discounted the effects of context, new information, such as origin and origin in
light of context, appears to influence investors, as shown by a positive interaction term (p < .01). Similarly, the 101-day cumulative period also reveals a positive and significant interaction term (p < .02).
Finally, the regression model as a whole does not explain much variance in excess returns, as evidenced by the low R2 statistics. However, the
F-statistics reveal that the model does account for significant variance in
excess returns for all but the 2-day announcement period. A significant F
suggests that at least one hypothesized relationship is not equal to zero.
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TABLE 3

Results of Multiple Regression of Succession for Two Time Horizons
2-day

200-day

Succession Perioda Leadership Periodb
Standard Standard
Variables

Intercept
Context

-

Betas

.001

-.004

Errors

Betas

.004

-.041

.007

-.083t

Errors

.029
.048

Originc .012* .006 .068t .037
Interaction of context and origin .025 .017 -.022 .115
Size

-

.000

F4.472
R2

.001

1.52

.01

-

.004

.004

2.48**
.02

aDefined as t - 1, t = 0.

bDefined as t + 100, t + 300.
c Origin is a dichotomous dummy variable with 0 = inside successor, 1 = outside succes
sor.

tp < .10
* p < .05
**p < .01

Further, the importance of each independent variable changes over the different time horizons. These findings support the contention, raised in management journals, that research needs to assess investors' reactions to corporate events over a number of pre- and post-event time periods.
It is also important to note that the multiple regression model includes
size as an independent variable, and in no case does size emerge as an
important explanatory variable. Further, size is significantly correlated with
origin, although the correlation, as reported in Table 1, is small (- .13). The
low magnitude of correlation suggests that any distortions in the regression
coefficients due to multicollinearity were minor. The explanation for finding
no size effect may lie in the construction of both the data set and the excess
returns measure. Recall that the data set only consists of large firms and that
the returns measure uses a control that minimizes extraneous influences on
stock returns like size.

Table 4 presents two contingency matrixes to help clarify the form of the
significant interaction terms and in the process provide additional insight as
to the two contingent relationships predicted by the third hypothesis.
Regarding the first contingent relationship, investors seem indifferent to
origin when succession occurs in low-performing firms. Whether leaders are
appointed from inside or outside an organization, the values of these lowperforming firms drop an additional 4 percent during the 50-day postsuccession time frame and about 6 percent overall for the 101-day cumulative time frame, suggesting that investors are generally pessimistic about the
ability of a new leader to reverse a firm's behavior. The findings on insiders
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TABLE 4

Contingency Matrixes: Mean Excess Returns by Origin and Context
(a) 50-day Post-succession Period
Performance Context

Origin
Insiders

-.038

High
(.123)

Low

-.042

144

Outsiders

.021

(.133)

-.038

17

Mean

difference

(.154)

131

(.200)

23

1.85t

0.11

(b) 101-day Cumulative Interval
Performance Context

Origin

Insiders

-.036

High

(.160)

-.056

144

Outsiders

.071

(.250)

Low

-.057

17

Mean

difference

(.183)

131

2.53**

(.249)

23

0.02

a In each cell, the first number is the mean excess return expressed as a decimal. The
number in parentheses is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the mean. The bottom number is the number of observations for that cell.

b Overall, during the designated 200-trading-day period, firms in the high performance
succession context (the top thirtile) had a mean excess return and standard deviation of 0.204
(.175) and the low performing firms (bottom thirtile) had -0.324 (.139). To maximize contrast,
we excluded 162 midrange performers from this investigation but included them in the regression analysis. Overall, the midrange performers had a mean excess return and standard devi-

ation of -0.083 (.057).
t p < .10
** p < .01

are therefore consistent with the third hypothesis, but the findings on outsiders are not. We predicted that outsiders will be more able to turn low
performers around than insiders would be.
Regarding the second contingent relationship predicted by the third
hypothesis, the results suggest that good presuccession performance amplifies investors' positive evaluation of an outside appointment. The value of
these firms' stock increased an average 7 percent during the 101-day succession interval, a mean return significantly larger ( p < .01) than the 3.5
percent decline observed for inside appointments in the same performance
context. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction that outsiders will
be less able than insiders to maintain high performance.
DISCUSSION

This study showed that investors typically seem to revise t
tations of cash flows downward during the time surrounding a succession
announcement. However, not all appointment announcements convey neg-
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ative information. For example, investors appear to react favorably to announcements when the two independent factors-high performance and
outside appointment-coincide.
Since the results for outside appointments in high-performance settings
departed from expectations, some reconciliation with prevailing theory is in
order. Fundamental to the second and third hypotheses is the assumption
that outsiders have a disruptive influence on organizations because they are
less committed to the organizations' strategies, values, and people than are
insiders. Perhaps, contrary to expectations, high-performing firms are more
receptive to hiring from the outside because the security and status of existing managers are relatively secure during periods of prosperity. As Helmich (1975) stated, successful groups may perceive a new successor as a
force that will stimulate change and reinforce positive behaviors. This is not
to say that capable insiders could not be as effective, but rather that the pool
of all available candidates may be larger for high-performing firms. Moreover, perhaps investors interpret the appointment of an outsider to a highperforming firm as a signal of the firm's intention to remain adaptive. Perhaps investors expect outsiders to serve investors' interests more than entrenched insiders. These explanations are generally consistent with those in
a recent Hay Group Incorporated study reported in Business Week (1986). Its
major finding was that many firms, including companies that are growing,
benefit by putting outsiders in key positions.
The annoucement of an inside appointment in the high-performance
context may not convey the same adaptive message. Rather, an inside appointment may signal the continuation of the previous administration's
mind set. Although that is not necessarily bad, organizational studies have
shown that when success breeds pervasive continuity, political obstacles to
reorientation grow.

The result for outside appointments in low-performance contexts is also
interesting because it suggests that although the appointment of an outsider
may be an essential ingredient for turnaround, it may not be sufficient.
Perhaps an outsider brought into a low-performance context with the task of
turning a company around will have a great disruptive effect. One reviewer
of the present research pointed out, however, that the level of disruption
may have more to do with the expectations the members of a firm hold
regarding the origin of the successor than the origin per se. For example,
Gouldner (1954) found outsiders to have a disruptive influence, but Guest
(1962) did not. However, the gypsum mine workers in Gouldner's study
were accustomed to inside successors, and the employees at the automobile
plant in Guest's study were expecting an outside successor. A second reviewer suggested caution when comparing leadership succession among industrial workers with executive succession at large corporations.
Perhaps, in a competitive market for management talent, lowperforming firms are unable to attract the best available managers (Pfeffe
Davis-Blake, 1986). Or perhaps such firms, faced with dwindling resources,
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deteriorating morale, and competitive disadvantages in their current product
markets, tend to continue to decline in spite of a leadership change. Whatever the explanation, one point is clear: succession-induced turnarounds
such as Chrysler Corporation's may be the exception. As Hambrick and
Schecter noted: "There is an abundant folklore on how to revive poorly
performing businesses, but systematic evidence about turnaround is scant"
(1983: 231).

The overall evidence suggesting that investors view outside successors
more favorably than insiders is puzzling, given the dearth of outside appointments. Recall that investors reacted favorably to outside appointments
at the time of announcements (the two-day succession effect). Further, they
continued to revise their expectations significantly upward during the postsuccession period and the long-term leadership period. In light of these
findings, why are insiders favored by a margin of nine to one?
Other questions emerge from the findings of this study. What motivates
a high-performing firm to change leaders? Are low-performing firms openly
aware of their poor performance? Do investors react more favorably to firms
in which the transition between top managers is orderly and to firms that
disclose the true reasons for a change in CEO? These questions call for
additional investigations of succession events.
Finally, this study has implications for traditional event-study methodology and for the conclusions of succession studies that have used such
methodology. First, we introduced a measure of security benchmark returns
that retains the advantages of stock-price measures and overcomes their
principal limitations. Second, this study investigated investor reactions to
succession announcements over various horizons preceding and following
the events and found that the results of the regression model were significant
for all but the two-day announcement period. Further, this study found that
each explanatory factor is important during a different horizon. The contrast
in findings for the two-day announcement period and the longer horizons
suggests that studies that rely on short horizons immediately surrounding an
event may not accurately capture succession-related returns. This observation does not call into question the efficiency of capital markets but suggests
that investors cannot make final judgments on what they do not yet know
with certainty. Since all recent empirical investigations of succession in
large organizations have used a potentially biased measure of performance,
and most have used short horizons, it is not surprising that a consistent set
of findings about whether a new leader can alter corporate performance has
not emerged.
CONCLUSIONS

This study has shown that the performance context of a succession
event and the origin of a newly appointed leader moderate the relationship
between the succession and its consequences for performance in large cor-
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porations. In general, succession conveys negative information to investors.
However, they seem to revise their expectations of cash flows upward when
outsiders are appointed to high-performing firms.
The study has limitations that temper the strength of its findings. It
focused on one background factor and one dimension of organizational context while controlling for size. We did not control for the multitude of other
possible background and context factors but assumed their influence would
be random. A recent study by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), however, found
that stock prices predicted CEO succession only when a predecessor was
less than 63 years old. Another limitation of the present study is that it used
chief executives as the units of analysis. Although it is true in most firms that
the chief executive exerts the most power of any manager, Hambrick and
Mason (1984) asserted that studying entire management teams may increase
the predictive strength of a model. Finally, the study followed a stringent
decision rule when defining origin. Vancil (1987) suggested a less stringent
rule, whereby appointees with one to five years of tenure in an organization
were considered outsiders.

Clearly, there are opportunities for future research. Nonetheless, emp
ical analysis of premises concerning executive background characteristics,
organizational context, and corporate size have been long overdue, and the
current study made an attempt to test some of those premises.
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APPENDIX

Derivation of Betaa

Beta (ret,t mret3t)- (N) ( retit) ( mret3t)
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where

reti,t = log of (1 + return for s
mrett = log of (1 + value-weigh
mret3t = (mrett_1 + mrett + m

N = the number of observations for the year.

a See the CRSP Daily Excess Returns File for additional detail.
b This is a three-day moving-average market window.
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